A calm before the storm? The socio-political situation in Ukraine

A calm before the storm? The socio-political situation in Ukraine
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While the war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine is slowly turning into a frozen conflict, the socio-political situation in Ukraine is entering a phase of calm, with short-term prospects for political upheavals and popular discontent present but rather low. Yet longer-term evolutions do not bode well for the stability of the country, as several factors need to be taken into consideration.

Could early parliamentary elections take place in the coming months? Everyone in politics agree that the Rada needs to be relaunched in order to take in the recent political evolutions. However, only Yulia Tymoshenko's party Fatherland (BuYT) and the Opposition Bloc, to a lesser extent, are currently pushing for the organization of early parliamentary elections. Only the BuYT is today adamantly sure to score higher than the 2014 elections: according to a recent poll from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), Fatherland would come in first with 15.4 percent of the votes. Nevertheless, about 60 percent of voters are still undecided - but the tendency is there. Early elections would considerably change the political landscape inside the Rada, with the risk of making it ungovernable and without the possibility to create a majoritarian alliance between party factions, as political pluralism is likely to increase. In this, the presidential party Bloc of Poroshenko (BoP) would only score 14.5 percent today, and would therefore lose some of its 143 seats at the Rada. Most importantly, elections would mean the complete and total political disappearance of the Popular Front of former Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk: with no chances for his party to pass the 5 percent threshold for representation in the Rada, the Popular Front would lose all its 81 MPs.

With the virtual disintegration of the post-Maidan political coalition in the Rada, the two-faction coalition of the BoP and the Popular Front barely hold together a fragile majority (and need the support of other factions for almost every single vote). Early elections would be a catastrophe for them. Other political formations present in the Rada (Samopomish, Radical Party, Vidrozhennia, etc.) would score more or less the same, making early elections a potentially dangerous bargain. A political "hot spot" will take place in April 2017, when Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman will have to present the results of the Cabinet before the Rada: depending on oligarchic alliances, a vote of defiance is not completely excluded - and would therefore plunge the country in political chaos.

A moving political situationThe Ukrainian political landscape tremendously evolved since the end of Maidan and voters are today increasingly disappointed by politicians - about 60 percent of them declare so. New parties have been created, such as the Russian-funded populistic Za Zhitya ("For Life") or the Dmytro Yarosh Initiative (DIYA), born from the remnants of Right Sector. Populism and populist rhetoric have today become the baseline of political talk in the opposition: it represents a traditional tool used by opposition parties to systematically denounce the Cabinet and the President. Parties such as the Radical Party, Svoboda, or the BuYT are even competing for the monopoly on populism, with Yulia Tymoshenko surfing the wave better than anyone. Popular demands for political change are genuine but the results remain contrasted. Since early 2016, the newly-created liberal-leaning Democratic Alliance party - gathering a mix-and-match of reformists, civil society activists, Poroshenko disappointed and Europtimists at the Rada - is experiencing the full force of a political war waged by President Petro Poroshenko. This is not an isolated case, as the emergence of a new generation of politicians is systematically thwarted by the power with the use of administrative resources. Any attempts at changing the system and reforming Ukraine are seen as a potential threat to the government: in these conditions, progressive forces are unlikely to emerge anytime soon.

Regime consolidation around President PoroshenkoThe calculated destruction of political discontent needs to be analyzed in parallel with the clear-cut consolidation of powers in the hands of President Poroshenko since his accession to power in 2014. By placing his cronies at top governmental positions and sacking reformists, Poroshenko is ensuring a new kind of "vertical of power". Not one led by fear and repression as during the Yanukovych era but one of cronyism and personal allegiances. In this, Poroshenko represents the best of the "old" rule of power in Ukraine. Since nobody else would want to take his place at the moment (except maybe for Yulia Tymoshenko), he is free to arrange the political sphere and State institutions as he pleases, provided the oligarchic equilibrium are respected.President Poroshenko's relationship with Prime Minister Hroysman is increasingly tense and a competition seems to have settled between both men. Considered "Poroshenko's man", Hroysman is learning to be a national political player and wants to leave his personal mark in Ukrainian politics. His breathing room remains limited since he owes his nomination to an oligarchic choice engineered by Poroshenko. But that does not stop him from criticizing Poroshenko's decisions and adopting different positions once in a while. Aware of the growing competition, Arseniy Yatseniuk is currently reaching out to Hroysman in order to influence him against Poroshenko...

Towards a "social Maidan"?In this complicated political environment, popular discontent is growing against the absence of reforms (especially against corruption) and economic hardships provoked by the austerity packages required to obtain the IMF assistance. Many in Ukraine are therefore increasingly discussing the possibility of a "social Maidan" taking place in the coming months. Three existing pull factors limit this perspective. On the one hand, Ukrainians are still learning to live with the consequences and the psychological trauma of Maidan, and are therefore not yet ready to sacrifice themselves for another bigger cause. On the other, popular discontent is today fragmented and lacks unity around a common goal: some people demonstrate against corruption, others against utility price hikes, others demand justice reforms, etc. While no one is unified around a common aim and battle, discontent remains scattered and does not mobilize a critical mass. Finally, a clear opposition leader has yet to emerge to unify social movements and catalyze discontent against a common enemy. Without a purpose and a trigger, no "social Maidan" will take place right away. One thing is sure however: due to the proliferation of private battalions, paramilitary groups, and militias in Ukraine, the next social upheaval will be extremely violent.

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